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This paper proposes an on-line remedial action scheme (OLRAS) in order to mitigate the voltage violations caused by false data injection attacks (FDIAs) targeting under load tap changing (ULTC) transformers in smart distribution systems. The FDIA framework contains two different phases. In the attack phase, distribution system operator (DSO), being in attacker's shoe, considers cyberattack scenarios through compromising the results of volt-var optimization problem in a radial distribution grid modified with distributed energy resources (DERs) such as photovoltaic (PV) units and wind turbines (WTs). The outcome of the attack phase will be the compromised voltage profile of the distribution grid showing different rates of voltage violations. In the reaction phase, the DSO rapidly identifies a customized distribution feeder reconfiguration (CDFR) in order to update the flows of active and reactive power throughout the targeted distribution system and recover the voltage profile. The objective functions of the proposed CDFR are defined to minimize the impacts of such cyberattacks targeting ULTCs within distribution grids. This will empower DSOs to react to severe cyberattacks, bypassing the detection stage, and address the voltage violations in a timely manner. The effectiveness of the proposed OLRAS is validated on an IEEE test system. 

This paper presents a false data injection (FDI) attack model to target a selection of plugged-in electric vehicles (EVs) in a smart power distribution system resulting in a range of operational issues including but not limited to voltage collapse. To reduce the total cost and difficulty of the cyberattack, attacker utilizes a pre-attack analysis via generating PV and VQ curves for the buses of the distribution system in order to precisely recognize the weakest buses of the system (i.e., the most vulnerable ones) and also the required active and reactive power to be injected into the targeted buses to result in voltage collapse. The effectiveness of the proposed attack model is validated on an IEEE test distribution system modified to contain distributed generation (DG) and EV aggregators.